education, the National Health Service and housing subsidies follows in Section IV. We summarise our results in Section V and make some suggestions for future work in this area. For a more detailed account of the findings, including an analysis of distribution by socio-economic group, see Evandrou et al. (1992) .
II. THE CSO ESTIMATES AND METHODOLOGY
Each year the CSO publishes the results of an analysis of the distributional effects of taxes and benefits (in both cash and kind) in Economic Trends. (The most recent, for 1989 , is in CSO (1992 .) The results show the estimated value of various benefits and taxes for households in different quintile groups (fifths) of the income distribution, ranked by "equivalised disposable income', that is, income after allowing for cash benefits and direct (but not indirect) taxes, with the incomes adjusted to allow for the greater needs of larger households.
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The CSO's analysis assumes -as does ours -that the incidence of spending on education, the NHS and housing subsidies is on the households directly receiving each service. While this seems plausible, it is possible that the true incidence would show a different pattern -for instance, if employers are able to pay lower wages than they would have had to in the absence of state provision. The valuation put on benefits in kind provided by the public sector is their cost. In reality, recipients might put a different value on them (and these differences may vary with income level).
The results in CSO (1990) show that 'original' income (from private sources) is very unequally distributed, with the top fifth of households (ranked by disposable income) receiving more than 20 times as much as the bottom fifth in 1987. Cash benefits are worth more to households at the bottom, so that for gross income (original plus cash benefits) the corresponding ratio between the two ends of the distribution is reduced to six to one. The CSO figures suggest that, taken together, all taxes (both direct and indirect) had, by 1987, become roughly proportional. 'Post-tax income' is thus distributed in much the same way as gross income.
The final part of the CSO's analysis allows for benefits in kind, the focus of this paper. It demonstrates the combined effect of spending on public sector education, the National Health Service, housing subsidies, 2 rail and bus subsidies, school meals and welfare milk. The CSO suggests that, taken together, these benefits are worth significantly more for those with lower than for those 1 The equivalence scale used by the CSO gives a value of 0.61 for a single person and 1.0 for a married couple, with additions for children depending on their ages -for instance, 0.21 for a child aged 5-7 and 0.36 for one aged 16-18. Thus a single person with a disposable income of 6,100 would be placed at the same point in the income distribution as a married couple with an income of 10,000, or a married couple with children aged 7 and 16 and an income of 15,700. 2 General subsidies to council and housing association tenants -mortgage interest tax relief is taken account of in the treatment of taxation, and housing benefit in cash benefits. with higher incomes, for instance being worth almost twice as much for the bottom fifth as for the top fifth. The result is that 'final' income (including these benefits in kind) is less unequal than post-tax income, with the ratio of top fifth to bottom fifth reduced to 3.7 to one.
In what follows, we describe such a distribution -with greater absolute values for those with the lowest incomes -as being "pro-poor', while we describe distributions with greater absolute value for those with the highest incomes as "pro-rich'. Note that this means that benefits can be "pro-rich' in this sense, but still progressive in that they represent a greater proportion of income for the poor than for the rich.
If the CSO's estimates are correct, benefits in kind play a very important part in the living standards of households with low incomes. The CSO estimates that the bottom fifth of households receive only 6.9 per cent of post-tax income, but 9.9 per cent of final income. Conversely, while the top fifth receive 41 per cent of post-tax income, their share of final income is reduced to 36 per cent. The CSO estimates suggest that in-kind benefits are equivalent to over 70 per cent of post-tax income for the poorest fifth, but only 7 per cent for the richest fifth. The size of these differences makes investigation of the robustness of the estimates of considerable interest. Table 1 shows the CSO's estimates of the distribution of those benefits in kind. The first three columns, showing the services with which we are concerned here, are totalled in the fourth column. The final column shows the estimates including rail and bus subsidies, school meals and welfare milk, which we do not investigate below.
The first point to note is that the overall 'pro-poor' distribution (apart from a slight rise between second and third quintile groups) results from the combination of a more markedly pro-poor distribution within non-retired households (the results given are by successive fifths of non-retired households) and a roughly flat (and less valuable on average) pattern of benefits to retired households.
The second is the contrast between the different services. Education is shown as benefiting the poorer non-retired households in particular, but, for obvious reasons, not retired households. As students away from home are excluded, the distribution mainly reflects the greater proportion of families with school-age children in the lower part of the non-retired income distribution, the presence of children being one of the factors which lowers their 'equivalent' incomes. By contrast, health benefits are estimated to be more valuable to retired than to nonretired households. In both cases there is little gradient with income: the overall pro-poor distribution results from the greater value to retired households, which tend to be lower down the combined distribution. Housing subsidies are much smaller in scale and are shown as being generally pro-poor, and particularly so within the non-retired population. The overall pro-poor distribution thus results from a pro-poor distribution of each individual service. There are several reasons why alternative estimates might differ from the CSO's. The first is to do with the data source. The FES does not contain information on the use of the NHS. In order to allocate health spending to households, the CSO assumes that usage depends on the age and sex of household members, and allocates total spending accordingly. Yet usage may also depend on other factors, which may include or be correlated with income, which could mean that the distribution of health benefits in Table 1 was incorrect. The GHS data used below do contain direct information on the use of health services, as well as education and housing.
The other reasons relate to methodology. First, in estimating benefits from public spending on education, the CSO excludes spending on students living away from home. This is not only an important part of education spending, but it is also one which is unequally distributed across households. It might be argued that students are poor (as they have low current incomes) and so spending on them should be allocated to the lowest income groups. In our view this would be misleading. While students may have low current incomes, there is much evidence to suggest that they have relatively high lifetime incomes. Taking a longer-term perspective, whatever its indirect benefits for the economy and society as a whole, the direct benefit of spending on students more realistically goes to higher income groups. One solution to this problem (which we are examining in related research) is to look at all of these questions on a lifetime basis, allocating education to those directly receiving it, but looking at distribution in terms of lifetime incomes. Another, which is what we do in this article, is to examine the effect of allocating spending on the education of students living away from home to their parents. Their parents' position in the income distribution may well be a better reflection of the student's own longterm position; also parents may be at least partial beneficiaries, in the sense that they would have paid for tertiary education for their children if the state had not.
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A different methodological problem relates to the estimates of the value of housing subsidies. The CSO takes the total annual flow of recurrent subsidies to local authority housing and of (mainly capital) grants to housing associations, divided between Greater London, the whole of the rest of England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. It then divides the total between the council and association tenants in each of these areas in proportion to the gross (rateable) values of the properties they occupy.
There are several reasons for being sceptical about such results. The most important is that the cash-flow subsidies into local authority Housing Revenue Accounts are a poor guide to the value of the difference between actual gross rents and the economic value of the accommodation occupied (see Hills (1991) for a detailed discussion of the problems). Additionally, there is scope for refinement in the allocation of total subsidy, using a narrower breakdown between different English regions.
III. ESTIMATES BASED ON THE GENERAL HOUSEHOLD SURVEY

Comparison of Sample Characteristics
An immediate important difference between GHS-and FES-based results is that the latter are for the whole of the UK, whereas the former are for Great Britain. There are also some differences in the sampling methodology used and data collected by the two surveys. As a result of these, there is a slight difference between the income definitions used to rank households in the income distribution. The CSO uses 'equivalent disposable income', that is, income after including cash benefits and deducting direct taxes including rates. Our ranking is based on 'equivalent net income', which differs in that rate payments are not deducted from it (nor rate rebates included). The CSO's measure of "disposable income' averages 10,000 per household (3,800 for the bottom quintile group). Our measure of 'net income' averages 9,000 per household (2,800 for the bottom quintile group). 4 We use the same equivalence scale as the CSO to adjust the ranking for household size (for this and further details see Evandrou et al. (1992, Appendix 1) ). We also follow the CSO in using households as the unit of analysis (an approach which has the drawback that large households are implicitly given the same 'weight' as small ones). Despite these differences, Tables 2 and 3 show a high degree of consistency between the composition of the different quintile groups of all households in the CSO's analysis and in ours. Looking at Table 2 , we have more "retired' households 5 than the CSO. In the poorest quintile group we find rather more oneadult non-retired households and rather fewer households with children. As Table 3 shows, the main effect of this is that our bottom quintile group contains somewhat fewer adults than the CSO's bottom group. Overall, however, the make-up of our quintile groups is very close to the CSO's. As a result, there is no reason to expect that there would be significant differences in results stemming from demographic differences between the samples or the ways in which they have been divided into income quintile groups. 
TABLE2
Composition of Quintile Groups, 1987
Percentage of group in each category
TABLE3
Summary Demographic Characteristics of Quintile Groups, 1987
Demographic Differences between Income Groups
The differences in demographic composition between the different income groups are part of the reason for the different patterns of receipt of benefits in kind which we describe below. As can be seen from Table 3 , in both sets of figures the households in quintile groups 3 and 4 contain more people than the others. They also contain a larger number of children, particularly those in the third quintile group. In our results the bottom group has the lowest average number of people per household while the top group has the lowest number of children per household. This trend changes somewhat if one distinguishes between retired and nonretired households. The largest households with the greatest number of children are to be found in the middle of the overall income distribution. However, as Table 2 shows, more than half of the households in the bottom two groups are 'retired'. If one looks at non-retired households only, the number of children declines as one moves up the income distribution. These differences in the number of children per household affect the numbers in full-time education per household (shown in Table 3 ) and the distribution of education spending discussed below.
Summary of Results Based on the GHS
Against this background, our main results are summarised in Table 4 . The patterns in each service area, including the distinction between 'low' and 'high' estimates for the value of housing subsidies, are discussed further in section IV below. Our estimated totals for all households suggest no clear trend in absolute value of benefits in kind with income level. Benefits from the three services combined are most valuable for the middle quintile group, and least valuable for the top quintile group.
By comparison with the CSO estimates in Table 1 , the average level of benefits allocated is much the same (especially if the "high' estimate of housing subsidies is used), but the distribution is less markedly "pro-poor'. The reason for the difference can be seen to lie in the combination of benefits to non-retired households, which are pro-poor (but not to as great a degree as in Table 1 ) and benefits to retired households, which show a flatter pattern and which have a much lower average value.
Looking at the individual service areas, the greatest contrast is in the distribution of education benefits. In contrast to the CSO estimates, which suggest that the value of education (excluding students away from home) for the top quintile group is not much more than half the average, our estimates suggest that the top quintile group receives more than the average, and more than the bottom two quintile groups. Both sets of results allocate the greatest receipts to the middle quintile group. The key difference comes from the greater value of benefits we allocate to the top two quintile groups of non-retired households, and the lower (but still above average) receipts which we estimate for the bottom non-retired group.
The shape of the distribution of health benefits for all households is very similar to that found by the CSO, but on a smaller scale. Our estimates only account for about 75 per cent of NHS spending, and allocate much less to retired households than do those of the CSO. As far as non-retired households are concerned, we find an even more clearly pro-poor distribution than the CSO. However, this is more than offset by the way in which our estimates suggest that health benefits for retired households -half of all the households in the bottom two groups of the overall distribution -are less than 50 per cent of the size estimated by the CSO. The reasons for this are discussed below. Bottom  20  470  130  330  610  820  2  20  510  130  310  660  840  3  30  520  100  250  640  790  4  30  630  90  210  750  870  Top  30  440  40  100  510  570  All  30  510  100  240  640  780 Source: Own analysis of 1987 GHS.
Retired households
Our 'low' estimates of housing subsidies average much the same as the CSO's, but our 'high' estimates are much greater. (Note that our estimates are only for council tenants, not those of housing associations.) In either case, our estimates are markedly more pro-poor than those of the CSO, resulting in particular from a greater and more pro-poor estimate of subsidies for non-retired households. Because housing subsidies are so clearly pro-poor, the overall shape of the distribution of in-kind benefits shown in the final column of Table 4 is affected by the choice of 'low' or 'high' estimates of them. With the 'high' estimate, the bulge in the middle of the distribution is less marked and the relative position of the top group is worse.
IV. BENEFITS IN KIND BY SERVICE
In this section we examine the estimates outlined above in more detail, disaggregating the totals for each service, and looking in more detail at the differences between retired and non-retired households.
Education
As noted above, the main difference between our estimates and the CSO's comes from the distribution of education benefits. Across all households, we have shown that the greatest education benefits go to the middle of the income distribution and the benefits for the top of the distribution are higher than those for the bottom. Table 5 shows that this is the result of a combination of factors. The bottom two quintile groups of all households receive very little in the way of education benefits beyond compulsory schooling. Meanwhile the top group receives, on average, conspicuously less from state schooling than the other groups, but substantially more from further and higher education. The top group of all households receives nearly five times as much from tertiary education as the bottom group.
This picture is slightly muddied by the fact that the vast majority of education benefits are received by non-retired households. Thus the lower average receipts of the bottom two quintiles are in part due to the fact that they contain a large number of retired households who are receiving no benefits in kind from education. Focusing on non-retired households only, it can be seen from Table 5 that total education benefits are pro-poor, with successive quintile groups receiving less than the group below. However, benefits from schooling and those from tertiary education operate in opposite directions.
The main reason for the gradient in benefits received from schooling is the average number of children per household in each group. Households in the bottom quintile of non-retired households contain an average of 1.2 children compared with only 0.4 in the top one. This demographic effect is compounded by differential use of private schools, overwhelmingly concentrated at the top of the distribution. 6 Of households in the bottom two income groups, 44 per cent report some receipt of benefit from primary and/or secondary schools, in contrast to only 18 per cent of households in the top quintile group. The amount of benefit per recipient also varies across income groups: households in the bottom group that do benefit from state schooling gain on average 2,100 compared with 1,650 for beneficiary households in the top fifth (see Evandrou et al. (1992 , Table A2 )). Benefits in kind from schooling are thus pro-poor even when one looks only at recipient households.
For those non-retired households benefiting from tertiary education, there appears to be little difference in the average value (4,150 for the bottom group and 4,020 for the top), but benefits from tertiary education are disproportionately received by households in the top two quintile groups. The main reason for this is the inclusion in our analysis of benefits in kind from higher education, in particular university education, accruing to non-resident students (further discussed below). Only 5 per cent of the bottom quintile group report receipt of any benefit in kind from further education, compared with 12 per cent of the top two groups.
Given the importance in our estimates of benefits from tertiary education in moderating the pro-poor influence of educational benefits, it is useful to compare the effect of our methodology with that used by the CSO. The impact of the different techniques is illustrated in Figure 1 . The figure shows our estimates, separating out the average values of tertiary education excluding non-resident students (that is, using the CSO methodology, but not presenting the actual CSO results). The procedure employed for calculating receipt of benefits from state schools by the CSO was virtually identical to ours, except that the CSO had direct access to private sector utilisation rates from the FES whereas we imported weights from that data set into our analysis. However, the impact of this on average benefits in kind received from schooling by quintile group should be minimal. The CSO then allocates benefits from further and higher education to adults in the households which reported use of them. Again this procedure was replicated in our analysis, as was the exclusion of student-only households. Beyond this, our approach deviated from the CSO's. We additionally assigned benefits accrued by non-resident students to their household of origin. The rationale behind this is explained in Section II above. The effect of this on the total distribution is shown by the upper shaded area in Figure 1 .
The figure shows that the addition of benefits to non-resident students has little impact on the gradient up to the third quintile group. However, for those households higher up the income distribution, the effect of including benefits to non-resident students is substantial. Only 0.5 per cent of the bottom two quintile groups were allocated benefits for non-resident students compared with 3.3 per cent of the top quintile group. In the top group of all households, the average benefit due to non-resident students is actually greater than benefits from tertiary education accruing to residents within the household. This is not surprising, given what is known about differential access to higher education. Furthermore, residents tend to be studying on part-time courses or courses at colleges of further education whilst non-resident students are primarily studying at (what were) polytechnics, universities or other higher education establishments, the costs of which are much higher. This is reflected in the average value of benefits received per recipient -an average of 2,430 for households in the top quintile group with resident students compared with 6,800 for those with non-resident students. Putting both of these factors together, the average value of higher education benefits for non-resident students was 10 times as great for those in the top quintile group as for those in the bottom quintile group. Table 6 compares our results including and excluding non-resident students with the CSO's actual estimates, concentrating on non-retired households only. It can be seen that the difference in estimates of education benefits in kind is not only due to differences in methodology. Although the average benefit across all non-retired households if one excludes non-resident students is much the same in both sets of results (i.e. using the CSO's methodology), the distribution across quintile groups is very different. Our results are significantly less pro-poor than the CSO's, even before taking benefits accruing to non-resident students into account.
The reasons for this difference are not clear as the demographic composition of both sets of quintile groups is very similar (see Tables 2 and 3 ). Education benefits are primarily affected by the number of children in each group, which are similar in both analyses. It could be that their age composition is different, but it is more likely that the difference results from the application of different cost data. 
National Health Service
Overall the NHS results by income group in Table 4 show a distribution that is pro-poor, the lowest quintile group receiving 62 per cent more than the highest. Interestingly, though, the pattern is not smooth, with the lowest two groups receiving about the same, but the third (middle) group receiving more than any other. Indeed, were it not for the relatively low figure for the top group, the distribution would be better described as equal or unpatterned. A distributional pattern that favours the poor overall is not surprising since the poor tend to report more ill health than the better off. One would also expect the higher groups (and perhaps particularly the highest) to make more use of private care.
7 Moreover, the pattern is consistent with other work using previous years of the GHS (Hurst, 1985; O'Donnell and Propper, 1991). 8 However, our pattern is not quite consistent with that suggested by the CSO. As noted above, the CSO does not allocate NHS expenditures by actual usage. Instead it is estimated "according to the estimated average use made of various types of health service by people of the same age and sex and according to the total cost of providing those services'.
9 As with our estimates, the CSO's show a pro-poor distribution, with the lowest quintile receiving 63 per cent more than the top (see Table 1 ), but its gradient is smoother and the scale larger. Table 7 gives a breakdown of the distribution by income group for different sectors within the NHS. It is apparent that much of the pattern of the aggregate distribution derives from the distributions of the two most expensive services -GP consultations with a prescription and in-patient stays, especially the latter. For all households these both show a similar pattern, with the bottom three quintile groups receiving about the same, and the top group receiving the least. The distributions of expenditure on out-patients and on GP consultations without a prescription show little clear pattern.
The predominance of in-patient stays, both in terms of overall expenditure and in determining the aggregate distribution, is not surprising, but is none the less a pity; for it is here that GHS data are weakest. The data refer only to number of spells as an in-patient, not to length of stay (which may well differ by income group). Also, for obvious reasons, the GHS does not interview people in hospital and hence it misses a proportion of users (which again may differ by income group).
7 It should be noted that the tax expenditures associated with private health care are not included in this part of the analysis. 8 There is an important (and controversial) question as to whether the pro-poor distribution of NHS spending matches the distribution of ill health. This is not the concern of this paper; for a review of the debate, see Le Grand (1991). 9 CSO, 1990, p. 110 . The benefits from maternity services are assigned separately to those households containing children under the age of 12 months.
Further insights may be gained from disaggregating households into retired and non-retired. The distribution for retired households shown in Table 7 is much more equal than that for all households, with the highest quintile group receiving nearly as much as the lowest (both receive less than the middle three groups). This suggests that the possible explanation for the relatively low consumption of the top group overall in terms of private medical care may have some validity, since the chronic conditions that affect elderly people are often ineligible for private insurance coverage. It will be interesting to see whether there is any change in this pattern in later years following the extension of tax relief to private health care insurance payments by elderly people. Bottom  110  20  70  570  780  2  110  20  110  530  780  3  130  30  90  560  810  4  110  30  90  450  680  Top  70  20  70  310  480  All  110  20  90 480 700 Bottom  150  30  100  790  1,070  2  130  30  100  630  900  3  130  30  100  580  840  4  100  30  90  430  650  Top  70  20  70  290  450  All  120  30  90  550  780   Retired households  Bottom  80  10  60  320  470  2  80  20  60  350  510  3  90  10  70  340  520  4  90  10  110  420  630  Top  80  10  90  270  440  All  80  10  80  340  510 Source: Own analysis of 1987 GHS.
Non-retired households
Not surprisingly, given the pattern for retired households, that for non-retired households is much more pro-poor. Interestingly, the decline with income is also smooth. Again, much of the work is being done by in-patient stays and by GP consultations with prescription.
However, this disaggregation between retired and non-retired households reveals a problem in comparing our results with those of the CSO. While our estimate of average expenditure for non-retired households is broadly the same as that of the CSO (780 compared to 770), that for retired households is about half (510 compared with 1,140) . Moreover, the fact that, within our estimates, the expenditure per retired household is less than that per non-retired household is itself a little surprising, given what we know of the relative morbidity patterns of the two groups of households. However, retired households contain 1.45 people on average, compared with 2.85 for non-retired households. This means that our estimates of NHS spending per household member average 350 for retired households, compared with 270 for non-retired households. This differential in favour of members of retired households is still smaller than one might expect.
The reason for our low estimate for the retired is not clear. According to the GHS, the proportion of all retired households making any use of each of the NHS sectors investigated is less than the proportion for the non-retired. In addition, fewer retired users of NHS services reported multiple use.
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The explanation probably lies in the fact that the GHS does not interview people in institutions, including old people's homes, nursing homes and longstay hospitals. Since these institutions are likely to contain a substantial proportion of retired households, and, moreover, these households are likely to have a higher-than-average use of the NHS, their omission must result in an underestimate of NHS use by the retired. The CSO estimates do not suffer from this problem, since the age-utilisation rates they employ in their imputation procedures include utilisation by people in institutions. However, the CSO's procedure of allocating institutional spending to the retired households in the FES sample (which also excludes those in institutions) will overstate the receipt of health benefits by the non-institutional elderly population. Our procedure has the advantage, important in this context, of allowing for variation in use by income group within the non-institutional population.
The main cause of the "pro-poor' distribution which we find within the nonretired population is the much lower use of health services by those in the top quintile group. Most importantly, only 14 per cent of households in the top quintile group reported an in-patient stay in the previous year, compared with 29 per cent for the bottom group. This was reinforced by somewhat fewer reported multiple in-patient stays (Evandrou et al., 1992, Tables 10 and 11) .
Housing Subsidies
In estimating general housing subsidies, we measured subsidies to local authority tenants as the difference between actual gross rents and those which would be charged if local authority housing departments earned an 'economic' real return on their assets. While this is preferable in principle to the CSO's approach of allocating 'cash-flow subsidies', it does not lend itself to very precise estimates. This is because it is not entirely clear what number should be taken to represent an "economic' return, nor how much of this return should be expected to accrue by way of real capital gains on the property owned. Appendix 1 of Evandrou et al. (1992) describes the methodology we used to establish a range between 'low' and 'high' estimates of economic subsidies. Averaged over all households, these give a range of 70 to 180 per year. Table 8 shows that the clear decline in average subsidy as one rises through the income distribution results from two very different trends. On the one hand, there is a steep decline in the proportions of households in each income group which are local authority tenants: from 56 per cent of the bottom quintile group to only 4 per cent of the top one (the downward trend is not quite so steep amongst retired households, but is still dramatic). By contrast, if one looks at recipients (i.e. council tenants) only, average subsidy rises for those in the higher income groups -those in the top quintile group receive between 50 per cent and 100 per cent more than those in the bottom group, depending on which estimate is used.
11 In other words, general housing subsidies are worth most on average at the bottom of the income distribution, but this is because more of those at the bottom of the distribution are council tenants. Within the population of tenants, those with higher incomes tend to receive more valuable subsidies.
The distribution within the tenant population mainly reflects the small differentials in council rents in 1987-88 between larger and smaller properties and between those in high-and low-cost parts of the country. This latter point is illustrated by Table 9 . This shows that the regional averages of our capital value estimates (at unadjusted first quarter of 1988 prices) vary considerably, values in London being 3.5 times those in Scotland. Net rents (after deducting management and maintenance but not depreciation) varied much less, and were actually lower in 1987-88 in Greater London than in any other region (this is because gross rents were only a little higher, but spending was much higher, than in other regions). The result is the regional pattern of average subsidies shown in the third and fourth columns. Our estimates suggest average subsidies in London between 2.6 and 3.5 times the national average (allowing for the actual stock distribution across the country), but between a negative value -actual rents Table 9 .4).).
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
(1) The Central Statistical Office's estimates, based on FES data, suggest that benefits in kind from education, the National Health Service and housing subsidies are strongly "pro-poor', with a total worth 91 per cent more for the bottom than for the top quintile group. As taxation as a whole represents much the same proportion of gross income for all income groups, the net effect of this spending is substantially redistributive (in the sense that if public spending on these services was eliminated and the savings used to reduce all taxes by equal proportions, the poor would be worse off and the rich better off). (2) Our estimates, based on GHS data, suggest a much less clearly pro-poor distribution of benefits in kind, with the total for these services worth most in the middle of the distribution (and education found to be of least value for the bottom two quintile groups). None the less, the total is between 19 and 35 per cent higher for the bottom quintile group than for the top, so that the pattern is still redistributive (in the sense described above). (3) Like the CSO, we find a flat distribution for retired households and a propoor distribution for non-retired households. However, this finding for non-retired households results from a more strongly pro-poor distribution of benefits from the NHS than found by the CSO, but less strongly pro-poor benefits from education. (4) For education, the most important reason for the difference between the estimates is our allocation of tertiary education for non-resident students to their household of origin (whereas the CSO omits them). This item appears to be so strongly pro-rich (worth 10 times as much for the top fifth of the income distribution as the bottom fifth) that it cannot be regarded as redistributive (in that its elimination combined with equi-proportional tax cuts would result in lower income groups being better off and higher groups being worse off). (5) For health, our methodology suggests lower use of services at the top of the distribution with, in particular, half as many of the top quintile group of non-retired households reporting an in-patient stay in the last year as of the bottom group. (6) Our estimates of general housing subsidies are larger in scale than those of the CSO (even on our "low' estimate), and more strongly pro-poor. This pattern results from the much greater proportion of council tenants at the bottom of the income distribution than at the top, partly offset by a pattern of subsidy per tenant which favours tenants with higher incomes.
In conclusion, this analysis using GHS data is interesting in its own right and has also suggested some lessons as to how future exercises of this kind (both official and non-official) could be improved:
(a) Omission of higher education for students living away from home is a problem, arguably making the distribution appear to be more pro-poor than it really is. (b) Income may be an important factor in receipt of services from the NHS for non-retired households, a factor which is not captured by the CSO's current methodology. (c) The relativity between the benefits from the NHS received by retired and non-retired households has a significant effect on the overall distribution; future studies could probably improve on both our methodology and the CSO's. (d) There are problems with the cash-flow measures of housing subsidies used by the CSO (especially for housing associations). Although using estimates of "economic subsidy' would be a departure, the CSO already does something similar in estimating the value of owner-occupiers' "imputed rents'. Our estimates also suggest that it is important to distinguish between regions within England, not just between London and the rest of the country. This might also be worthwhile for the other services (if suitable cost data could be found).
(e) We imported some information from the FES to improve our GHS-based estimates. The process could be used in reverse for FES-based studies, for instance importing data on health service utilisation from the GHS.
